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Abstract 
The failure to spot emerging systemic risk and prevent the current global financial crisis 
warrants a reexamination of the approach taken so far to crisis prevention. The paper argues 
that financial crises can be prevented, as they build up over time due to policy mistakes and 
eventually erupt in “slow motion.” While one cannot predict the precise timing of crises, one 
can avert them by identifying and dealing with sources of instability. For this purpose, 
policymakers need to strengthen top-down macroprudential supervision, complemented by 
bottom-up microprudential supervision. The paper explores such a strategy and the 
institutional setting required to implement it at the national level. Given that the recent 
regulatory reforms that have been undertaken to address systemic risks are inadequate to 
prevent and combat future crises, the paper argues that national measures to promote 
financial stability are crucial and that the Westphalian principles governing international 
financial oversight should be rejected. The paper proposes that while an effective national 
systemic regulator should be established, strong international cooperation is indispensable 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
With a few notable exceptions, central bankers, financial supervisors/regulators, other 
policymakers, international organizations, the private sector, and academic economists 
failed to predict the current global financial crisis and underestimated its severity. Such 
a dramatic failure of the entire financial community warrants soul searching: Is it 
possible to prevent a systemic crisis?  In this paper we argue that this is indeed 
possible and that the best way to prevent a financial crisis is to identify and act on 
systemic risk or sources of financial instability.  
Using a new database, developed by Laeven and Valencia (2008), on the occurrence 
of systemic banking crises and policy responses to resolve them, one can see that all 
of the crises have two elements in common. Virtually all of the countries that suffered a 
crisis had made serious policy mistakes, and accumulated significant structural 
vulnerabilities and financial imbalances. In virtually all instances, the crisis was slow to 
unfold and could have been “spotted” in its early stages and managed better. In all 
instances, there were underlying vulnerabilities. The financial markets were very 
forgiving and often provided policymakers with the benefit of doubt. When it became 
obvious that policymakers were unable or unwilling to address the underlying 
problems, the financial markets were damaged by a loss of confidence, which 
eventually led to crises. 
The devastating global financial crisis of 2007–2009 offers a set of initial lessons. The 
new lessons learned are more substantial than those learned in the past, as what was 
considered as the best financial systems—the United States (US), the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Continental Europe—all went wrong. The objective of this paper is to explore 
how to spot signs of systemic risk and prevent a financial crisis. We argue that an 
effective framework for systemic stability regulation should be established in each 
country, but that such a national effort would not be sufficient without the US and the 
UK—hosts to global financial centers and where the crisis originated—making a full 
political commitment to systemic stability regulation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the importance of crisis 
prevention and argue that effective macroprudential supervision—a top-down approach 
complemented by bottom-up microprudential supervision—can effectively spot and 
prevent crises. In Section 3, we provide basic principles in establishing a systemic 
financial regulator from the perspectives of objectives and mandates, resources, 
implementation, and structure. Section 4 reviews recent reform proposals considered 
nationally and internationally to address systemic risk, and recommends that each 
country create a framework for systemic stability regulation or even an independent 
financial stability regulator. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for future 
action.  
2.  IMPORTANCE OF CRISIS PREVENTION 
2.1  Policy mistakes behind the global financial crisis 
 
The root cause of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 traces back to the buildup of 
excessive optimism—created by a long period of world-wide high economic growth, low 
real interest rates and subdued volatility of financial prices—as well as the flood of 
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liquidity. With these benign macroeconomic and financial environments, investors 
around the world were prompted to search for yield and underestimated the risks of 
investment, especially those in new financial products. From this perspective, the IMF 
(2009a) summarized causes of the global financial crisis in three dimensions: flaws in 
financial regulation and supervision; failure of monetary policy to address the buildup of 
systemic risk; and a weak global financial architecture. 
2.1.1  Flaws in Financial Regulation and Supervision 
Several excellent reviews of what went wrong in financial regulation (Group of Thirty 
2009; Brunnermeier, et. al. 2009; de Larosiere Group 2009) point to the fact that there 
were regulatory and supervisory deficiencies, including inadequate macroprudential 
supervision. 
Essentially, national financial regulators and supervisors failed to see the large buildup 
of systemic risks. In the US, the regulatory and supervisory framework was highly 
fragmented and its scope was narrowly focused on insured deposit-taking institutions 
and did not cover all financial activities that posed economy-wide risks. As a result, the 
“shadow banking” system grew among investment banks, mortgage-brokers and 
originators, special investment vehicles, insurance companies, and other private asset 
pools, as they had long been lightly regulated by a patchwork of agencies and 
generally not supervised prudentially.
1 
Due to the propensity to focus on individual institutions, supervisors around the world 
failed to recognize interconnections and links across financial firms, sectors, and 
markets due to the lack of a macroprudential approach. Supervisors only focused on 
their own piece of the puzzle, overlooking the larger problem. Shin (2009) pointed out a 
fallacy of aggregation: “mis-educated” supervisors and examiners were focused on 
individual institutions, without regard to the impact on the system. There is thus 
growing realization that a macroprudential approach to supervision and an effective 
systemic stability regulator are needed to complement microprudential measures.  
2.1.2  Failure of Monetary Policy to Contain Financial Imbalances 
The latest IMF analysis pointed to “macroeconomic policies, which did not take into 
account building systemic risks”
2 and states that, “a key failure during the boom was 
the inability to spot the big picture threat of a growing asset price bubble.” Clearly, the 
US Federal Reserve underestimated the buildup of financial imbalances coming from 
housing price bubbles, high leverage of financial institutions, and interconnections 
between financial markets. In addition, Taylor (2009) argued that the Federal Reserve 
policies brought excessive liquidity and low interest rates to the US and that the federal 
funds rate was kept too low for too long, fueling the housing boom and other economic 
imbalances. The Federal Reserve may well have assumed that even if the asset price 
boom collapsed, the impacts on the financial system and the economy could be 
mitigated by lower interest rates.
3 
                                                  
1 Tobias and Shin (2008) estimate that the "shadow banking" system was as large as US$10.5 trillion, 
comprising US$4 trillion assets of the large investment banks, $2.5 trillion in overnight repos, US$2.2 
trillion in structured investment vehicles, and another US$1.8 trillion in hedge fund assets. This 
should be compared with US$10 trillion in assets held in the conventional US banking system, which 
meant that system leverage was at least double what was reported. 
2 IMF (2009b).  
3 Wessel (2009) provided a well-documented and insightful account of the thinking of US policymakers 
during the crisis. The inescapable conclusion is that for a long time after the start of the crisis, central 
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In theory, tighter prudential regulation could have been mobilized to contain systemic 
risk, but in practice, before the authorities realized it, huge systemic risks had 
accumulated below the regulators’ radar, in the shadow banking system. Given the 
failure of prudential supervisory action to prevent a buildup of systemic risk, the central 
bank, as a macro-supervisor, should have reacted to credit booms, rising leverage, 
sharp asset price increases, and the buildup of systemic vulnerabilities by adopting 
tighter monetary policy.  
2.1.3  Weak Global Financial Architecture 
There were deficiencies in the global financial architecture—the official structure that 
facilitates global financial stability and the smooth flow of goods, services and capital 
across countries. There are three issues. 
First, global institutions—like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), and the Financial Stability Forum—failed to conduct 
effective macroeconomic and financial surveillance of systemically important 
economies, that is, they did not clearly identify the emerging systemic risk in the US, 
the UK and the Euro Area, send clear warnings to policymakers, or provide practical 
policy advice on concrete measures to reduce the systemic risk.
4 Their analysis clearly 
underestimated the looming risk in the shadow banking system, interconnections 
across financial institutions, markets, and countries, and global macroeconomic-
financial links. 
Second, there was considerable discussion of global payments imbalances during 
2002–2007. The IMF in particular warned repeatedly, particularly through the newly 
established Multilateral Consultation process, that global imbalances posed a serious 
risk to global financial stability. However, the global imbalance discussion may have 
diverted policymakers’ attention away from US “domestic” financial imbalances toward 
“global” imbalances, the risk of dollar collapse, and the need to revalue the People’s 
Republic of China’s currency.  
Third, the crisis has revealed the ineffectiveness of fragmented international 
arrangements for regulation, supervision, and resolution of internationally active 
financial institutions. The problem became particularly acute when such institutions 
showed signs of failing. Although home country authorities are mainly responsible for 
resolving insolvent institutions, host-country authorities were often quick to ring-fence 
assets in their jurisdictions because of the absence of clear international rules 
governing burden sharing mechanisms for losses due to failure of financial firms with 
cross-border operations.  
2.2  Principles of Crisis Containment 
The most fundamental approach to a financial crisis should be to prevent one from 
taking place in the first place. Once a crisis breaks out, however, efficient crisis 
management and resolution policies become important.  
                                                                                                                                            
bankers—Bernanke, King, Trichet, and their colleagues—did not see the crisis coming and for too long 
ignored the advice of those who did. 
4 The IMF (2009a) admitted that “official warnings both within and outside the Fund were insufficiently 
specific, detailed, or dire to gain traction with policymakers.” IMF surveillance often echoed the 
conventional view that advanced countries—such as the US and the UK—with relatively low stable 
inflation together with profitable and well-capitalized banking sectors could withstand the unwinding of 
the bubble in housing and capital markets. 
  3ADBI Working Paper 189    Kawai and Pomerleano 
The key principle should be: ”Crisis prevention is better than cure.” This entails the 
prevention or mitigation of the buildup of vulnerabilities that could lead to systemic risk 
and eventually a financial crisis. The major preventive mechanisms should include: (i) 
establishment of effective regulation and supervision that monitors and acts on 
economy-wide systemic risk; (ii) a sound macroeconomic management framework (for 
monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies) that can counteract the buildup of 
systemic vulnerabilities such as asset price bubbles; and (iii) creation of a strong 
international financial architecture that can send pointed early warnings and induce 
effective international policy coordination to reduce systemic risk internationally. In the 
prevention exercise, the macroprudential approach is becoming increasingly important. 
Once a financial crisis breaks out, it is necessary to adopt comprehensive policy 
measures so that the crisis does not magnify or prolong itself. Crisis management tools 
include: (i) provision of timely and adequate liquidity; (ii) rigorous examination of 
financial institutions’ balance sheets, including through stress tests; (iii) support of 
viable but ailing financial institutions through guarantees, nonperforming loan removal, 
and recapitalization; and (iv) adoption of appropriate macroeconomic policies to 
mitigate the adverse feedback loop between the financial sector and the real economy, 
reflecting the specific conditions and reality of the economy. An important challenge is 
how to ensure that such management policies do not create moral hazard problems. 
Finally if a financial crisis evolves into a full-blown economic crisis, with systemic 
damages to the financial, corporate, and household sectors, it is vital to quickly resolve 
the problem. Crisis resolution measures include: (i) use of mechanisms for 
restructuring financial institutions’ impaired assets and, hence, corporate and 
household debt; (ii) use of well-functioning domestic insolvency procedures for 
nonviable financial institutions; and (iii) use of international mechanisms for resolving 
nonviable internationally active financial institutions, including clear burden sharing 
mechanisms. Without a clearly-defined regime for the resolution of financial institutions 
domestically and internationally, the crisis management process can create 
international conflict, such as ring-fencing of foreign bank assets. 
It is noted that the nature of a crisis resolution mechanism affects crisis management 
policies and the degree of moral hazard for financial institutions. Later in this section 
we summarize the discussion by arguing that a systemic stability regulator with 
sufficient powers should be established at the national level that focuses on all the 
three dimensions: crisis prevention, management, and resolution. Given that the role of 
the global stability regulator—the IMF and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)—may be 
limited, the role of a national stability regulator will be critical.  
 
2.3  Macroeconomic and Financial Surveillance and 
Macroprudential Supervision 
Several excellent reports that have addressed the need to improve financial regulation 
and supervision from systemic perspectives agree on the following:
5 the financial 
regulatory frameworks around the world have paid too little attention to “systemic risk”; 
current financial regulations have tended to encourage procyclical risk taking, which 
                                                  
5 These include: the Volker recommendations in the Group of Thirty Report (2009); the Geneva Report on 
the World Economy (Brunnermeier et al. 2009); the de Larosière report (2009) on financial supervision 
and stability in the European Union; and papers by a group from New York University’s Stern School 
(e.g., Acharya and Richardson 2009).  
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increases the likelihood of financial crises and their severity when they occur; and 
current regulations do not deal adequately with “large complex financial institutions”—
financial intermediaries engaged in some combination of commercial banking, 
investment banking, asset management, and insurance—whose failure poses a 
systemic risk or “externality” to the financial system as a whole (Haldane 2009). They 
also point to the danger induced by implicit “too big to fail” or “too interconnected to fail” 
problems.  
The traditional bottom-up supervision addressing the soundness of individual 
institutions is founded on the assumption that making each bank safe will make the 
whole system safe. The focus on individual institutions and the inadequate attention 
paid to the overall system evident in this approach explains how global finance has 
become so ripe for contagion without sounding regulatory alarms. Crisis prevention 
necessitates taking a macroprudential approach to complement the existing 
microprudential supervisory rules.  
To understand the nature of macroprudential supervision, it is useful to consider the 
examples of a broad agenda to address systemic risk, outlined by Bernanke (2009) 
and Tarullo (2009). Box 1 lists a set of issues that effective supervisors and regulators 
should bear in mind. In our view, the financial stability monitoring agenda summarized 
in the Box might be suited to the US, but it is too narrow for emerging market 
economies. The objects of systemic oversight should be broader, including the 
corporate and household sector, as well as macroeconomic elements, such as capital 
flows and external debt. 
Box 1: Agenda to Address Systemic Risk 
 
  Undertake consolidated supervision of all systemically important financial firms;  
  Monitor large or rapidly increasing exposures, such as to subprime mortgages, across firms 
and markets, rather than only at the level of individual firms or sectors; 
  Assess the potential systemic risks implied by evolving risk management practices, broad-
based increases in financial leverage, or changes in financial markets or products;  
  Analyze possible spillovers between financial firms or between firms and markets, such as 
the mutual exposures of highly interconnected firms;  
  Ensure that each systemically important firm receives oversight commensurate with the risks 
that its failure would pose to the financial system;  
  Provide a resolution mechanism to safely wind down failing, systemically important 
institutions, such as the development of an orderly resolution of systemically important non-
bank financial firms;  
  Assign uniform and robust authority for the prudential supervision of systemically important 
payment and settlement systems to ensure that the critical financial infrastructure—including 
the institutions that support trading, payments, clearing, and settlement—is robust, such as 
arrangements for clearing and settling credit default swaps (CDS) and other over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives;  
  Work to mitigate procyclical features of capital regulation and other rules and standards;  
  Identify possible regulatory gaps, including gaps in the protection of consumers and investors 
that pose risks for the system as a whole; 
  Work to mitigate the risk of sudden stops in capital flows triggering an exchange rate 
correction with adverse impact on banks, households, and corporations with large unhedged 
liabilities; 
  Share findings in a regional and global stability forum; and 
  Issue periodic reports on the stability of the financial system, in order to ensure market 
discipline through transparency as well as informed debate. 
 
Source: Bernanke (2009) and Tarullo (2009). 
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Essentially the aim of macroprudential supervision is to preserve systemic financial 
stability by identifying vulnerabilities in a country’s financial system and calling for 
policy and regulatory actions to address those vulnerabilities in a timely and informed 
manner to prevent a crisis. In contrast to microprudential supervision, which takes a 
“bottom-up” approach that focuses on the health and stability of individual institutions, 
macroprudential supervision takes a “top-down” approach that focuses on the 
economy-wide system in which financial market players operate, and helps assess 
sources of risks and incentives. It requires the integration of detailed information on 
banks, nonbank financial firms, corporations, households, and financial markets. 
3.  SYSTEMIC STABILITY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES 
We propose that each country should establish an effective, powerful systemic stability 
regulator that is in charge of crisis prevention, management and resolution. Using the 
methodology first presented by Carmichael and Pomerleano (2003) to address the role 
of a systemic stability regulator, this section presents a rigorous framework that 
systematically reviews the following four components: 
 
  Objectives and mandates—i.e., what the stability regulator expects to achieve; 
  Resources—i.e., the political backing, legal support, and human and financial 
resources to enable the stability regulator to carry out its objectives and 
mandates effectively;  
  Implementation—i.e., the instruments, tools, and techniques that the stability 
regulator uses to achieve its objectives; and 
  Structure and organization—i.e., the organizational structure of the stability 
regulator that is able to perform the delegated financial stability responsibilities 
in the most effective way. 
3.1  Clear Objectives and Mandates of a Systemic Stability 
Regulator 
Regulatory objectives and mandates are what the systemic stability regulator expects 
to achieve. When a systemic crisis takes place, financial authorities are forced to be 
intensively involved in managing and resolving the crisis. However, those actions take 
place after the onset of a crisis. One of the most important functions of the systemic 
stability regulator is to monitor, anticipate, and intervene prior to a crisis. Such an 
approach and methodology would aim to preserve systemic financial stability by 
spotting vulnerabilities in a country’s financial system, so that, if necessary, actions 
could be taken in a timely and informed manner to prevent a buildup of systemic risk 
and an eventual crisis from occurring. The role of the systemic stability regulator would 
be to strengthen, not displace, examinations and supervision focused on individual 
institutions. 
The major objectives and mandates can be summarized as:  
•  Monitoring systemic risks—such as large or growing credit exposure to real 
estate—across firms and markets; 
•  Assessing the potential for deficiencies in risk management practices, broad-based 
increases in financial leverage, or changes in financial markets and products, 
creating systemic risk; 
  6ADBI Working Paper 189    Kawai and Pomerleano 
•  Analyzing possible spillovers between financial firms or between firms and 
markets—for example through the mutual exposures of highly interconnected firms;  
•  Identifying possible regulatory gaps—including gaps in the legal regime governing 
the insolvency of financial institutions—that pose risks for the system as a whole; 
•  Curtailing systemic risks across the entire financial system encompassing 
corporations, households, and capital inflows as well as arrangements for crisis 
management and financial institution resolution—through legislative action, 
prudential measures, advising on monetary policy, and intervention in individual 
institutions; and 
•  Issuing periodic reports on the stability of the financial system. 
The stability regulator needs to have a clear mission mandate addressing expectations 
and responsibilities. It must conduct a macro-financial surveillance and take a 
macroprudential approach to supervision that addresses risks to the financial system 
as a whole in an effort to enhance economy-wide financial stability and prevent 
systemic crises. This would include the monitoring of corporate finance and household 
debt, which have implications for monetary policy and financial stability, as well as 
international banking flows which bear on systemic stability due to the risks of sudden 
stops.
6  
The stability regulator would also organize the immediate response to a crisis, the 
strategy for coordinated financial and corporate sector restructuring, and the orderly 
resolution of failed corporations and financial institutions. The stability regulator is thus 
charged with express responsibility for containing systemic risks in the financial 
system.  
3.2  Sufficient Regulatory Resources to Fulfill Responsibilities 
The systemic stability regulator needs sufficient political, legal, legislative, human and 
financial resources to carry out its objectives and mandates effectively. It would need 
substantial analytical capabilities and resources to identify the types of information 
needed, collect the required information, analyze the information obtained, and develop 
and implement the necessary policy, supervisory and regulatory response. The stability 
regulator should be allowed to obtain information from assessments and programs of 
the central bank (if the central bank does not have the full responsibility of systemic 
stability regulation) and other financial supervisors whenever possible. It would further 
need broad authority to obtain information—through data collection and reports or, 
when necessary, examinations—from a range of financial market participants, including 
banking organizations, securities firms, and key financial market intermediaries.  
In some countries, the stability regulator might be able to rely on private companies (for 
example, credit bureaus and rating agencies) to collect corporate data or might assign 
this responsibility to bank supervisors. To collect the necessary data the stability 
regulator would have to operate in a system that provides the capacity to enforce 
compliance or exact a commensurate penalty when companies are found to be in 
violation of laws. This includes the authority to craft an orderly resolution of 
systemically important financial firms and benchmarks to limit leverage. Essentially, the 
stability regulator would require knowledge and expertise across a wide range of 
                                                  
6 In emerging markets a corporate sector that is highly leveraged and unprofitable or that is prone to 
currency mismatches (as in Indonesia and the Republic of Korea in 1997) can lead to massive 
problems. See Kawai (2000). 
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financial firms and markets to offer a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to 
systemic risk. 
3.3  Effective Implementation by the Systemic Stability 
Regulator 
The systemic stability regulator should possess the entire implementation arsenal—the 
instruments, tools, and techniques to be used to achieve its objectives and mandates. 
These include macroprudential supervisory tools to reduce systemic risk, such as the 
ability to impose capital and liquidity requirements, limit leverage ratios, loan-to-value 
ratios and debt-to-income ratios, as well as setting the policy interest rate and 
introducing (or revising) legislation concerning insolvency regimes for nonviable 
financial firms.  
The systemic stability regulator would need to set the standards for capital, liquidity, 
and risk management practices for financial firms, given the importance of these 
matters for the aggregate level of risk within the financial system. A comprehensive list 
of macroprudential measures is discussed in Borio and Shim (2007). Table 1 offers a 
partial list of such measures.  
Table 1: Macroprudential Supervisory Measures  
Measures 
Competition regulation 
Limits on the “too big to fail” or “too interconnected to fail” problem 
Market conduct regulation 
Macro prudential measures  
Higher standards on capital requirements and risk management for systemically important 
firms 
Limits on financial firms leverage, such as leverage ratios, and maximum  
Efforts to mitigate pro-cyclicality with automatic countercyclical provisioning, such as a form 
of dynamic provisioning 
Limits on sectoral exposure (corporations, households) 
Households  
Loan-to-value (LTV) restrictions for mortgages 
Limits on consumer debt, eg, debt-to-income ratios 
Corporations  
Limits on leverage, such as limits on debt-equity ratios 
Limits on tax advantages, such as disallowing interest deductibility for leverage exceeding a 
certain level or foreign currency denominated loans 
External 
Limits on external debt 
Limits on currency and maturity mismatches 
Source: Authors’ summary. 
Boris and Shim (2007) suggest that macroprudential actions may be taken in a gradual, 
sequenced manner in the face of a buildup of vulnerabilities and systemic risk. For 
example, once a sign of built-up vulnerabilities is identified, a stability regulator would 
need to issue warnings. When vulnerabilities worsen but the problem is largely limited 
to a certain sector of the economy—such as commercial real estate and household 
mortgages—targeted tools could be mobilized, including sector-focused stress tests, 
tightening lending and underwriting standards, and limiting loan-to-value ratios and/or 
debt-to-income ratios. If the problem were to become more generalized and threaten 
systemic stability, then raising minimum capital requirements could be called for; and if 
the problem were built through markets and unregulated institutions, as opposed to 
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banks, then tightening monetary policy by raising policy interest rates could be more 
effective.  
Inadequate information, in part due to limited data capture—inadequate efforts and 
excessive parsimony in expenditures on human resources and databases—is possibly 
the biggest obstacle to adequate monitoring, analysis, and macroprudential 
supervision.  
3.4  Effective Organization of a Systemic Stability Regulator 
The organizational structure of the systemic stability regulator must be designed in the 
most effective way possible to carry out the delegated responsibilities of financial 
stability.  The focus of the stability regulator should be on the macro-financial 
surveillance of the system, which is an analysis of an economy’s macroeconomic and 
financial developments, as well as macroprudential supervision which is a top-down 
approach that helps assess sources of economy-wide risks. Such an organization 
would require political independence, credibility, and transparency as well as an 
adequate level of staffing, who possess knowledge, expertise, and experience across a 
wide range of financial institutions and markets.  
An important issue is whether the systemic stability regulator should be a single entity 
or a collective effort among different national financial authorities, each with a different 
specific responsibility. Key financial authorities include: the central bank, financial 
supervisor(s), and the finance ministry. The central bank is critical to financial stability 
as the monetary policymaker to set the policy interest rate in response to the 
emergence of systemic vulnerabilities as well as the outbreak of a crisis, and as the 
lender of last resort to protect a country’s payments system. A finance ministry should 
also be involved in stability regulation as crisis resolution invariably entails fiscal 
outlays—whose costs should be made transparent and accounted for explicitly in the 
fiscal budget. 
First, a fully consolidated stability regulator, combining all the functions of central 
banking, financial supervision and regulation, and treasury—as in the case of 
Singapore—could be the ideal arrangement from the perspective of maintaining 
financial stability.
7 This option requires the establishment of a new national agency in 
charge of systemic stability regulation, absorbing all the macroprudential functions and 
monetary policymaking from other authorities. However, because of the heightened 
emphasis on central bank independence, this model is not a realistic option for many 
developed countries.  
The second option would be for the central bank to play the systemic stability regulator 
function by taking over macroprudential supervisory and regulatory powers. However, 
an argument can be made that a central bank is not in the best position to take sole 
responsibility of maintaining financial stability—as this responsibility requires much 
broader expertise and culture than traditional central banking. This arrangement could 
also expose the central bank to the risk of political interventions once the eruption of a 
crisis requires management and resolution policies.  
                                                  
7 Singapore has not had significant financial crises. Japan had a land price bubble in the late 1980s and 
a systemic banking crisis in the late 1990s, despite the fact that the finance ministry had the power to 
supervise and regulate banks and the central bank was not independent (see Kawai 2005). So the most 
important element of success or failure may not be in the organizational structure of such a systemic 
stability regulator, but in how it functions. 
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  10
The third option would be to establish a coordinated systemic stability regulatory 
council, comprising the finance minister, the central bank governor and the head(s) of 
national financial supervisors. An independent, powerful working group that supports 
this council, may be chaired by a reputable expert (like former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker) and include finance and central bank deputies, head(s) of 
supervisors and other relevant parties as active members, with authority to engage in 
crisis prevention, management, and resolution. The working group would provide 
recommendations for policy actions to the council which would make the ultimate 
decision. In this instance a country’s central bank may assume a secretariat role, given 
its usual advantages in analysis of macro-financial surveillance for systemic stability. 
4.  ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF SYSTEMIC STABILITY 
REGULATION 
4.1  Global Practices of Central Banks in Financial Stability 
The role of a country’s central bank is critical to promote financial stability. There is a 
view that the central bank should be responsible for financial stability in addition to the 
usual responsibility of price stability. There are several reasons for making such a 
recommendation. First, in the US, full employment and price stability are the dual 
mandates conferred by Congress on the Federal Reserve in the conduct of monetary 
policy. Financial stability is an essential element in achieving those objectives. Second, 
there are important synergies between the systemic stability regulation and monetary 
policy, as insights garnered from performing one of those functions inform the 
performance of the other. Third, close familiarity with private credit relationships, 
particularly among the largest financial institutions and through critical payment and 
settlement systems, enables the central bank better able to anticipate how its actions 
could affect the economy. Finally, the lender of last resort function of the central bank is 
a natural link between the central bank and the emergence and reduction of systemic 
risk. 
Table 2 summarizes information on the structure of financial supervision and regulation 
and the role of central banks in prudential supervision. Of the 84 countries listed in the 
table, 30 have an integrated prudential supervisor, 20 have supervisory agencies in 
charge of two types of financial intermediaries, and 34 have multiple sectoral 
supervisors. The central banks of 48 countries (57% of the total) have the authority of 
banking supervision, and of these 48 countries 39 (81%) are developing and emerging 
economies. It is informative to note that in countries with multiple sectoral supervisors, 
central banks almost always have this supervisory authority. 
Table 3 summarizes the central bank mandates of the G20 members and a few Asian 
economies. In all cases the central bank is in charge of price stability as well as 
payment system stability, and in some cases it is in charge of supervising and 
regulating securities and insurance firms—in addition to banks. Close to half of the 
central banks have financial stability committees and most of them do publish financial 
stability reports, suggesting the presence of their analytical capacity to conduct macro-
financial surveillance. Also the central banks of Saudi Arabia and Singapore hold the 
responsibility of macroprudential supervision, and the majority of the world’s central 
banks do not. 
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Table 2: Economies with Single, Semi-Integrated, and Sectoral Prudential Supervisory Agencies, 2009 
(a) 
Agency Supervising Two Types of Financial 
Intermediaries 
 
Single Prudential Supervisor 
for the Financial System 









Multiple Sectoral Supervisors 
(at least one for banks, one for 


























South Africa* (1990) 
Sweden (1991) 
Taipei,China (2004) 
United Arab Emirates* (2000) 








































































































United States * 
 
Total - 34 
Notes: (a) The table focuses on prudential supervision, not on business supervision (which can be carried out by the same agencies or by separate agencies, 
even in the integrated model). Also, the table does not consider deposit insurers, even though they play an important role in banking supervision in a number of 
countries and can do so under any regulatory model. (b) The authorities announced plans to integrate prudential supervision in their central banks in 2006. (c) An 
asterisk (*) indicates that banking supervision is conducted by the central bank. 
Source: Čihák and Podpiera (2006). Updated by the authors.  
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Table 3:  Mandates for the World's Major Central Banks 
   Financial system stability 






















Argentina  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  ---  --  Yes 
Australia  Yes Yes  Yes -- --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Brazil  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  --  --  --  Yes 
Canada  No  Yes  Yes  --  --  -- -- -- Yes 
China (PRC)  No Yes  Yes -- --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Euro Zone  Yes Yes  Yes -- --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Hong Kong, 
China  No  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
India  No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  --  Yes  Yes 
Indonesia  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  --  Yes 
Japan  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  --  Yes 
Korea, Republic 
of  Yes  Yes  Yes  --  --  -- -- -- Yes 
Malaysia  No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  --  --  Yes 
Mexico  Yes  Yes  Yes  --  --  -- -- -- Yes 
Philippines  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  Yes  -- 
Russia  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  Yes  -- 
Saudi Arabia  No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Singapore  No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
South Africa  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  --  Yes 
Switzerland  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  --  --  --  Yes 
Thailand  No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  --  Yes  -- 
Turkey  Yes  Yes  Yes  --  --  -- -- -- Yes 
United Kingdom  Yes Yes  Yes -- --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
United States  Yes  Yes Yes Yes --  --  --  Yes  -- 
 Note: “—”means no role or in coordination with other agencies. 
Source: Authors' compilation of information from various central banks' websites. ADBI Working Paper 189    Kawai and Pomerleano 
 
4.2  Reform Proposals in the US, the UK, and the European Union 
National efforts to address systemic risk and promote financial stability are proceeding in the 
US and the UK, while regional efforts are under discussion in the European Union (EU).  
4.2.1  US Stability Reform Plan 
In the US, the Obama administration has proposed that the Federal Reserve become the 
nation’s financial stability overseer. The central bank would gain both the power to monitor 
risks across the financial system and the authority to examine any firm that could threaten 
financial stability, even though normally the Federal Reserve would not supervise the 
institution. The nation’s biggest and most interconnected firms would be subject to 
heightened oversight. The Fed would more tightly regulate systemically important financial 
institutions (“Tier 1 institutions”), even if they are not banks in the traditional sense (such as 
General Electric). The administration’s proposal calls for a “rapid resolution plan.” It 
mandates that systemically important financial firms be required to file a “funeral plan” 
regularly—a set of instructions for how the institution could be liquidated in an orderly and 
timely fashion should the need to do so arise. Finally, a new insolvency regime to be 
introduced will cover all such firms, modeled on the scheme run by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for ordinary banks.    
Against this Federal Reserve-led model there is a competing view that a “Financial Services 
Oversight Council” should be created to provide macroprudential oversight of the system, 
that is, to oversee systemic risk issues, develop prudential policies, and mitigate systemic 
risks. This council would include the Fed, regulators/supervisors, FDIC and the Treasury. 
This model could become effective if the council could clarify its objectives and mandates 
and acquire sufficient resources and implementation tools. Also the fragmentation of 
financial regulation and supervision would have to be eliminated by consolidating these 
functions into a single authority. This would help harmonize prudential regulatory standards 
for financial institutions, products and practices to prevent regulatory arbitrage and, hence, 
systemic risk.  
4.2.2  UK Stability Reform Plan 
The UK Treasury has proposed regulatory reforms as well. A “Council for Financial Stability” 
would be created to bring together the Bank of England (BOE), Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) and the Treasury. The FSA would be in charge of both macroprudential and 
microprudential supervision and address systemic risks, such as rapid credit surges, for 
example by requiring more bank capital. The BOE would have statutory responsibility for 
financial stability and would be given new powers to deal with troubled banks. However, the 
BOE objects that it does not have the tools it needs to maintain financial stability. 
The opposition party makes a very different proposal. It advocates the abolition of the FSA 
and the enlargement of the BOE mandate to absorb all of the FSA’s supervisory functions. 
Essentially this would transform the BOE into a key systemic stability regulator, signifying a 
return to the pre-1998 financial services regulation in the UK. Prior to 1998, responsibility for 
banking supervision was with the BOE, and the supervisory functions were transferred to the 
newly established FSA beginning in 1998. 
4.2.3  European Union Reforms  
In Europe, forging a robust approach to coordination is a big challenge, in particular on 
issues related to regional financial and macroeconomic stability. A high-level expert group 
headed by Jacques de Larosière (2009) proposed establishing two supra-national structures 
to deal with cross-border aspects of financial stability:  
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  A European System of Financial Supervisors, which would bring together existing 
national supervisors with three new sectoral EU-level authorities (for banking, 
insurance, and securities markets), and 
  A European Systemic Risk Council, which would monitor systemic risks and address 
them through coordinated policy responses from EU member states.  
The European Commission favors a systemic risk board to sound the alarm when it 
perceives a critical buildup of risk. It has drafted a proposal to establish a European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) that is in charge of EU-level macroprudential regulation and 
supervision. It would be headed by the president of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Although the ESRB would identify risks with a systemic dimension, issue risk warnings, and, 
if necessary, recommend specific actions to avoid the buildup of wider problems, it would not 
have any binding power to impose measures on member states, that is, its 
recommendations would not be legally binding. In addition, the role of monetary policy in 
financial stability is not clearly specified particularly when the demands of price stability and 
financial stability clash. These limitations could significantly weaken the role and 
performance of the ESRB as Europe’s regional systemic stability regulator. 
The EU recognized a second problem as well: the system for supervising cross-border 
banks is flawed, and the question of who should be in charge of Europe-wide bank oversight 
remains unanswered. The European Commission has drafted a proposal to establish a 
European supervisory authority to carefully monitor large cross-border financial institutions. 
Finally, new European Union laws are likely to require banks to strengthen capital cushions, 
liquidity, and counter-cyclicality. 
4.3  Alternative Models 
There are several models for systemic stability regulation, including a fully integrated model, 
a la Singapore; a central bank-led model as in the pre-1998 UK; and a coordinated “council” 
model. Although the fully integrated model could be ideal from the perspective of promoting 
financial stability, its establishment is now increasingly difficult due the rising demand for 
central banks to be independent from the government and political process. The central 
bank-led model is also possible, but it bears the risk of government interference particularly 
at the time of crisis management and resolution, threatening the independence of the central 
bank. However, in countries—particularly in many developing and emerging economies—
where the central bank is not independent, this model will likely remain viable.  
A realistic approach for most developed countries would be to establish a workable “council” 
approach, where the national financial authorities (the central bank, supervisor(s), and 
finance ministry) work collectively, as if they formed a single systemic stability regulator, to 
perform the stability regulation function. There exist frameworks for financial crisis 
management in the US, the UK and Japan (see Table 4). The “council” approach would be, 
in a sense, an expansion of this framework to address broader issues of crisis containment, 
including crisis prevention. But this should not be a mere expansion of the existing 
frameworks. 
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Table 4: Existing Framework of Systemic Crisis Management, the US, UK, Japan 





The following approvals are 
required to apply the 
systemic risk exceptions: 
  2/3 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) Board 
  2/3 of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal 
Reserve 
  Treasury Secretary after 
consulting with the 
President 
Based on the memorandum of 
understanding, Her Majesty’s 
(HM) Treasury, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), and 
the Bank of England (BOE) 
shall take coordinated actions 
for crisis management. 
  HM Treasury has the 
authority to nationalize 
banks. 
  HM Treasury shall provide 
blanket guarantee of 
deposits, based on the 
common law power 
The Prime Minister shall 
decide if the systemic 
risk exception (Article 
102, Deposit Insurance 
Law) should be applied, 
after consulting with the 
Financial Crisis 
Management Council 
(members listed below). 
Members    Treasury  Secretary 
  Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve 
  Chairman of the FDIC 
  Chancellor of Exchequer 
  Governor of the BOE 
  Chairman of the FSA 
  Prime Minister (Chair) 
 Chief  Cabinet 
Secretary 
  Minister of Financial 
Services 
  Commissioner of FSA 
  Minister of Finance 
  Governor of the BOJ 
Source: Financial Services Agency, Japan. 
For such a “council” approach to function successfully, the collective objectives and 
mandates as well as the division of labor among the authorities should be clearly defined, 
sufficient capacities and resources should be provided collectively, and all the necessary 
macroprudential tools should be made available for use. Most importantly a culture of 
sharing information should be developed and there should be intensive dialogue among the 
financial authorities. 
The central bank has a comparative advantage in macro-financial surveillance and may or 
may not have macroprudential authority (particularly tools). If the central bank does not have 
macroprudential authority, then it could still suggest the supervisor(s) to take certain 
macroprudential actions (such as an increase in capital adequacy ratios, a reduction of loan-
to-value ratios, etc) to contain a buildup of systemic risk. Similarly, the supervisor(s) can 
suggest that the central bank alter monetary policy to contain systemic risk. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our starting point is that a financial crisis is not an “unknown unknown,” though its precise 
timing and the magnitude of its severity might be. A crisis builds up over time in response to 
policy mistakes and investor herd behavior. While markets tend to be forgiving for a long 
time, the unsustainable imbalance is eventually corrected. By identifying and dealing with 
systemic risk—or sources of financial vulnerabilities—before it creates critical instability, 
policymakers could prevent a financial crisis. For this purpose, macro-financial surveillance 
and macroprudential supervision are vital, and a systemic stability regulator—or relevant 
financial authorities under a collective framework for systemic stability regulation—must act 
to avoid the buildup of large vulnerabilities and imbalances in each jurisdiction. In our 
experience, an inadequate effort to capture and analyze data is a key obstacle to conducting 
adequate macroprudential supervision. 
Several models are possible to choose from in creating a systemic stability regulator, 
including a fully integrated model a la Singapore, a central bank-led model of the pre-1998 
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UK, and a coordinated “council” model that has yet to be tested. For most countries, a 
realistic approach would be to take a “council” model, where (i) all financial authorities 
(central bank, supervisors, and finance ministry) work in a coordinated manner, including 
intensive information exchange and consultation, and (ii) the central bank conducts 
macroeconomic and financial surveillance while the supervisors take macroprudential 
actions in addition to microprudential supervision. It is highly desirable for supervisors to 
consolidate their supervision over banks, nonbank financial institutions, and markets. 
Even if such a framework for national systemic risk regulation is established, financial 
stability may be at risk without a global strategy to address financial crisis prevention, 
management and resolution. A successful international financial order can be constructed 
only with a binding set of minimum international standards. In the absence of such 
standards, the differences in national policies in accounting, information transparency, 
regulating leverage, and capital standards will likely lead to a regulatory arbitrage race to the 
bottom, with the competition from more pliant jurisdictions undermining more stringent 
regulatory regimes, and “exporting” financial instability.  
In this sense, the Westphalian principles of sovereignty that govern international financial 
oversight are not suited to the realities of an interconnected financial system in the 21
st 
century. If the financial authorities in major economies—such as the US, the UK, and the 
Euro Area—do not make progress in the creation of a binding global financial order, the 
prospects for attaining global financial stability are limited. The financially integrated world 
would have to continue to live with regulatory fragmentation, with all of its attendant risk to 
stability. In order to be successful, the recent reforms at the global level—that focus on the 
newly created Financial Stability Board—require that the US and the UK make strong 
political commitments to national and international financial stability regulation.  
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